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I. INTRODUCTION
The operational Flag Commander in command of a multi-
faceted Battlegroup has a multitude of "tools" to facilitate
the decision process necessary to direct his forces in peace
or in war. The number of sensors that provide timely and
accurate information about enemy forces is increasing as is
the sophistication of the enemy itself. These improved
electronic systems coupled with the ever increasing
sophistication of the naval forces throughout the world has
increased the information available to the flag commander
"ten-fold" over his WWII counterpart. This tremendous
influx of information available to the commander and staff
in the operational decision process can adversely effect the
same process through an "information overload". In a normal
fleet exercise, as many as 2000 electronically processed
messages [Ref.1: p. 16], numerous voice communications and
continuous electronic tactical information will be directed
to the flag staff in a single 24 hour period. This places a
tremendous burden on the command and control structure which
is intended to support the decision process.
The command and control structure is a collection of
equipment, personnel and procedures designed to assist the
decision maker gather, process, and effect composite
decisions. Automation within the command and control

organization is no longer an option. Many automated aids
have been developed to assist the operational commander such
as the Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS), Task Force
Command and Control Modules (TFCC) and the Outlaw Shark
Program. Measuring the success or failure of these systems
is not the purpose of this thesis. Rather, the process of
decision making within the flag organization, utilizing all
available information processing systems is the arena that
we wish to examine.
The most popular approach to the examination of the
military decision process in the past has been to use the
rational model of decision formulation. Although the
rational model has been used with some success in the
corporate world, it does not satisfy those decision
requirements in the military that are outside the realm of
simplicity, stability and certainty [Ref 2: p. 2]. In 1972,
Cohen, March, and Olsen proposed "The Garbage Can Model of
Organizational Choice", which addressed those organizational
decision situations which are uncertain and ambiguous in
nature [Ref. 3: p. 1 ]. They imply that the organization,
under this model, will have unclear goals, undeveloped
decision processes and decision makers who cannot, or will
not, devote consistent attention to the organizational
problems confronting them [Ref 4: p. 23]. It is within this
organizational environment that we will describe the
decision process at the flag level.

The central objective in the following chapters is the
development of a structured approach to the factors
influencing the flag decision process. Specifically, the
categories of decisions confronting the flag commander,
based on the information available and how that same
information moves through the flag staff will be examined.
After the "mechanics" of the decision process have been
proposed, we will integrate this process with specific areas
of applicability using the Garbage Can model of decision
making
.
The results of our flag interviews compare favorably to
flag interviews conducted by Harry E. Allen and David A.
Rannells in June 1982 in support of their thesis in a
similar area [Ref. 5], This decision-related information
formed the basis for much of the factual information
concerning the flag organizational information flow and
decision processes. The integration of the Garbage Can
theory with the flag decision process is presented not as an
exercise in support of the theory but as an insight to the
applicability of extensions of the theory to the military
decision process. These extensions include deadlines,
priorities, decision development triggering and the
influence of timing on the process.
Previously, no real military data had been collected and
run using the mathematical model developed by Cohen, March
and Olsen. Although observations of at-sea fleet exercises

were cancelled due to unit operational commitments, the
SEACON 84-1 war game was observed to collect data for input
to the model. The program originally written by Cohen,
March and Olsen was restructured by Dr. Daniel Guinier, of
the Naval Postgraduate School, in support of the decision
support research sponsored by NAVELEXSYSCOM. The results of
this endeavor are promising. No previous work has provided
empirical support for the decision processes and outcomes
predicted by the Garbage Can model.
10

II. THE MODEL AND THE MILITARY DECISION PROCESS
A. OVERVIEW
Military decision makers, although concerned with
decisions of both large and small consequences, are no less
fallible in the use of logic and influence than are
professionals in areas of general management. However,
military decision-makers, knowing the consequences of poor,
rushed decisions and influenced by events beyond their
control, must make decisions under considerable stress whose
outcomes can dictate a nation's survival [Ref. 6: p. 16].
The military commander does not operate in a vacuum. At his
disposal are numerous sources of information which he may
use to formulate and execute his decisions. This
information is in the form of electronic message traffic,
tactical display systems and intelligence data.
Until recently, the theories concerning organizational
decision making as supported by the concept of rationality
have dictated a structured choice process. Within this
assumption, a decision maker, acting under a set or group of
consistent goals and preferences, identifies as many courses
of action as possible, weighs the alternatives and selects
the optimizing alternative [Ref. 2: p. 1].
The rational model approach assumes that a decision
maker will make a choice based on predetermined preferences
11

and alternatives utilizing known techniques for relating
these preferences and alternatives [Ref. 2: p. 2]. In other
words, the decision maker knows what he wants, how to get it
and has the means and power to attain his goals based on
information he assumes to be correct. This model finds
little acceptance in the military decision process except
for routine administrative occurrences. The very nature of
the operational decision process faced by the battle group
commander precludes the assumptions stated in the rational
model. The commander is faced with operational decisions
with uncertain goals and choices, and must work with an
organizational structure which does not support the
optimizing approach of the rational decision process. As
Jay R. Galbraith has said concerning the planning process:
"...the greater the task uncertainty the greater the
amount of information that must be processed among
decision makers during task execution in order to achieve
a given level of performance. The basic effect of
uncertainty is to limit the ability of the organization to
pre-plan or to make decisions about activities in advance
of their execution." [Ref. 7: p. 28]
Many alternative approaches to organizational decision
making have been presented in lieu of the rational model.
Herbert Simon (1958), James March (1967), Richard Cybert
(1967), and Graham Allison (1969), have provided
examinations of the limitations of the rational model and
proposed alternative approaches to the decision process
[Ref. 2: p. 2], These various approaches have been
described in detail in two recent theses at the Naval
12

Postgraduate School. (These are noted as References 5 and
8.) This research endeavor will consider only the approach
presented by Cohen, March and Olsen in Ambiguity and Choice
in Organi za tions. The authors present a model or process
which attempts to explain behaviors within an organization
which were previously unexplained or ambiguous.
The military commander (specifically the battle group
commander) faces uncertainty or ambiguity in most decisions
within a tactical or strategic environment. There is a
level of risk to be realized within this environment
regardless of the information he has on which to base his
decisions. Ambiguity must be contrasted with levels of risk
and ignorance. As stated by Yates and Zukowski:
"A decision situation is said to be risky if the decision
maker does not know for certain what the ultimate outcomes
of his choices will be; yet he holds very orderly opinions
about the relative chances of the outcomes actually
occurring." [Ref. 9: p. 19]
If the decision maker has no basis whatsoever on which
to judge the relative likelihood of the potential outcomes
of his decision options, ambiguous decision situations will
exist between the extremes of risk and ignorance [Ref. 9: p.
19]. Hopefully, a military commander will tend toward a
decision based on risk and not that of the hasty decision
based on ignorance. The Garbage Can model, as discussed
here, is that process within a military organization which
will tend toward a decision based on actions bounded by the
information (electronic, intelligence, tactical, etc.)
13

available under outcomes which are, in a tactical sense,
ambiguous
.
Before discussing the correlation between the model and
the decision process within a battle group or flag staff, an
overview of the garbage can process is required to provide a
foundation for a more specific discussion of Garbage Can
mechanics
B. THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL
Within the framework of the Garbage Can model, the
organizational process can be viewed as several relatively
independent streams or variables within an organization
which come together within a "garbage can" or "arena".
These variables are: Problems, Solutions, Participants and
Choice Opportunities [Ref. 4: p. 26]. Problems are recog-
nized as concerns inside and outside the organization. They
arise within the arenas in which an organization exists at
the time they are identified. They are different from
choices and may or may not be resolved when choices are
made. Solutions are the product of someone's, or some
group's, intelligence. Many times they are considered
answers actively looking for a question or problem to solve.
March and Olsen suggest that within the context of
organizational problem solving, the question cannot be
determined without first observing the solution. This
denotes the ambiguity of the situation. Participants will
14

enter and leave the "decision arena" due to their own
preference or because other problems have placed demands on
them. In this this way we can witness decision makers
moving between problems and choice situations freely, as the
environment may dictate. Choice opportunities exist when
the organization is expected to exhibit behavior that can be
determined to be a decision or a course of action. Because
these choice opportunities may be of different or finite
duration, they may overlap, thus producing several streams
or garbage cans active at one time [Ref. 4: p. 26, Ref. 10:
pp. 1-3].
Cohen, March and Olsen present an overview of the
decision structure as a mapping of individuals on choice
opportunities or, as explained by Dr Lawson, "the rights of
the streams to participate in a choice opportunity" [Ref.
10: p. 1 ]. The authors describe this environment as an
array where N potential participants and M classes of
choices are represented by a decision structure in the form
of an N-by-M array. This array shows for every possible
participant the choice in which he has a right or claim to
participate. In the simplest case it is assumed that the
individual either has such a right or does not. This
example does not attempt to display the infinite
possibilities of all influences on the structure of an
actual decision process. It does, however, give insight into
15

the three major modes or organizing participation rights
[Ref. 4: pp. 28-31, Ref. 10: p. 5]:
1
. Unsegmented Participation
In this structure any decision maker can participate
in any active choice opportunity or garbage can. This
structure is represented by the following matrix:
DO =
Here dij = 1 if the i th decision maker (vertical
column) can have access to the j th choice opportunity
(across the top). This is denoted by the number "1" at the
intersection of any row and column.
2 . Hierarchical Participation
This structure places (both) decision makers and
choice opportunities in a hierarchy where the order of
importance is the key to participation. Here, important
decisions are made by important persons and the important
decision makers can participate in all choices. As the
decision flow proceeds downward to the less important
decision maker, decisions can be made only in choice
opportunities consummate with the person's status or rank.
This structure is represented by the following matrix:
1111
111





3 . Specialized Participation
This structure places each decision maker with a
single choice and each choice with a single decision maker.
The decision makers specialize in the choices to which they
will participate, but Dr Lawson has modified the structure
of the array to show that in a military environment (or
large organization), the "boss" may participate in any or
all choices if he so desires [Ref. 2: pp. 28-31 ]. This






Observations showing the access structure can be
defined in the same manner in which participation access was
developed above. The matrices may again be unsegmented,
hierarchical or specialized.
These cases (participation and access) represent
clear, well-defined occurrences of organizational decision
structure. In most real organizations, a mix of
participation and access rules will exist. Decision makers
will allocate energy and time to choices and problems. In
many cases, the energy available to devote to a problem is
not consistent with the time given for a problem to be
solved. A decision maker must distribute his available time
and energy to choices and problems based on preference,
priority, or organizational goals and objectives.
17

Three conditions will prevail when an organization
is operating within the garbage can modeling arena. First,
organizational goals are unclear or ambiguous. The relative
importance of goals or objectives will vary with time or
circumstances. Secondly, the technology is not clear. The
decision maker does not have the means of accomplishing
goals which are not clear or understood. Finally, decision
maker attention, or participation, is fluid. He may enter
and leave garbage cans independent of any agenda. The
decision maker is recognized as having limited time to
devote to specific problems, causing "breaks" or
inconsistencies in the natural flow of the process itself
[Ref. 10: p. 7].
Within a garbage can, decisions may be made in three
different ways; flight, oversight and resolution. In a
flight situation, a choice may be associated with a problem
for a period of time until a more attractive choice to the
problem arrives in the decision arena. The problem will
leave the original choice and "transfer" to the new one.
The original decision will be made, but in the authors'
words, "it does not solve anything". An oversight situation
exists if a choice becomes activated by the arrival of a new
problem. When existing problems are resident in other
garbage cans (assuming energy is available to make the
decision), the choice decision will be made quickly without
considering existing problems, and with minimum time and
18

effort expended. Finally, decisions can be made by
resolution, that is, choices will resolve problems after
working on them for a period of time. This is the familiar
context of a normal decision process [Ref. 10: p. 7].
The decision style of the organization, (i.e.,
performance), can be described within the above context as
problem activity, problem latency, decision maker activity
and decision difficulty [Ref 4: pp. 33-34]. Problem
activity is the measure of the activity of problems within
an organization. This will be a measure of the degree of
problem energy within the organization. Problem latency is
the measure of time a problem is active but not attached to
a choice, or as Dr J. S. Lawson puts it, "nobody's working
on it (the problem)" [Ref 10: p. 9]. Decision maker
activity is noted by the number of times a decision maker
moves from one choice situation to another. Finally,
decision difficulty characterizes the ease with which an
organization makes decisions. This is not a measure of
problem activity but one of summing the total period of time
in which a choice is active in a system.
Cohen and March developed a simulation model, in
order to test the general assumptions of the model and
subsequent decision performance. They issued their basic
findings as eight summary statistics which are reviewed by
Dr Lawson in [Ref. 10: p. 9].
19

1. Resolution is not the most common style for
making decisions, except under light load or when flight is
severely restricted. Flight and oversight seem to be more
prevalent.
2. The process is thoroughly sensitive to load.
High loading leads to lots of decision maker activity, but
few resolutions, and choices take longer to make.
3. DM's and problems seem to track each other
through choices. They tend to move together from choice to
choice. One result is that the DM's may feel that they are
always working on the same problem no matter where they go.
4. Presumably an efficient organization tries to
keep both problem activity and problem latency low through
rapid resolution of problems. This was never observed in
this model.
5. Many of the outcomes are distinct consequences
of the particular time phasing of choices (solutions?),
problems, and participant availability.
6. Important choices are much less likely to be
made than unimportant ones. Early arriving problems are
more apt to be solved than those that arrive later.
7. Important choices are much less likely to
resolve problems than are unimportant choices (meaning of
"choice unclear"). Important choices are made by flight and
oversight. The unimportant ones are made by resolution.
20

8. Although most of the choices (decisions?) do get
made, the choice failures that do occur are concentrated
amongst the most and least important. The important ones
which arrive late do not find enough energy available to get
solved and the unimportant ones are defeated by the queue
length. Intermediate choices are nearly always made [Ref.
10: p. 9]
.
The Garbage Can model and its preconditions do have
an intuitive correlation to many decision processes within
the military organization, specifically within the decision
process exhibited by the battle group commander and his
staff. In the next section the Garbage Can model will be
applied to the military process as well as some extensions
of the model required to describe the aspects of decision
making within the tactical military organization.
C. THE MILITARY DECISION MAKER AND THE MODEL
The correlation between the decision modeling
characteristics as described by the Garbage Can model and
the decision process of the battle group commander is
significant in many aspects. The framework of the Garbage
Can model where streams or variables come together within a
Garbage Can, or "arena", can functionally correlate with the
battle group or staff process. Problems are recognized
within the staff as either Tactical, Strategic or
Administrative in nature. Participants include the battle
21

group commander, staff, and senior and subordinate commands
(advisory and supportive). Solutions are the product of
someone's intelligence. Here, it is the product of the
group commanders' efforts through his supporting staff, many
times paralleled by subordinate commanders' efforts in their
assigned areas of responsibility. Regardless of support
responsibilities, it must be understood that no matter how
much staff deliberation occurs in a choice opportunity, the
decision is still that of the battle group commander and not
the responsibility of the battle group organization.
Contrary to the world of management, many decisions are
considered those of the organization and not of the top
official or CEO. Solutions in the military, as in the
business community, often enter the decision arena looking
for a problem with which to attach themselves. Within a
battle group staff, members will transfer unique abilities,
experience or education to choice opportunities where
problems may or may not reside. If problems do reside within
a choice opportunity, the solution can attach itself and the
decision maker's energy can then be applied to other problem
situations. However, many times these solutions looking for
problems can create problems that only the decision maker,
or his staff, recognizes as such. If this is the case,
excess energy will be spent at the expense of other,
possibly more important problems in the justification and
"selling process" necessary to support the problem.
22

Additionally, as March and Olsen have stated, it might
be that the question cannot be determined until we first
observe the solution. In the military context, this
ambiguity in choice is seen at many levels. Specifically in
the tactical arena, a commander will not be able to
determine which tangents are within an acceptable risk
boundary until he has decided the mix of weapons and
aircraft or ships he has at his command. Participants
within this ambiguous decision arena will move between
problems and choice arenas as the situations dictate or as
energy is available. Staff members will very rarely work on
only one problem in any given time. All will be assigned
areas of responsibility to which their energy is expected to
be directed. However, this channelled energy will be
directed to global problems, whereas staff members are in a
staff watch status or else their specific areas of
responsibility and problem /decision interaction are a part
of a larger decision arena which requires their combined
energies to manipulate a decision process.
The mapping of individuals to choice opportunities, as
described in the matrix organization presented by March and
Olsen [Refs. 2 and 10], is very useful when describing the
military commander and staff relationships in both specific
and global decision environments. Participation rights will
again be pointed out, but as in the initial explanation,
23

these rights apply to access rights as well [Ref. 10: pp. 5-
6].
1. In the unsegmented participation matrix, any decision
maker or staff member can participate in any active choice
opportunity or garbage can. This situation would prevail in
a staff meeting environment where problems and solutions are
discussed and solutions developed. Any decision maker,
regardless of station, can approach a problem or choice
opportunity as his desires or available energies dictate.
2. The hierarchical participation matrix places both
decision makers and choice opportunities such that the order
of importance is the key to participation. The more
important the decision required or choice opportunity
available, the higher up the chain of command the decision
maker will be located. This organization is probably the
most prevalent in the battle group organization. Again, it
must be kept in mind that those choices dealing with
tactical or strategic opportunities will usually be
represented by participation of the battle group commander,
but various choice opportunities will be developed by lower
level subordinates or subordinate commands before being
processed into one major choice opportunity to be acted upon
by the commander.
3. The specialized participation structure places each
decision maker with a single choice and each choice with a
single decision maker. Although the decision makers will
24

specialize in the choices to which they will participate, in
the military environment, the senior person can participate,
or have access to, any and all choices. This is the case
where the staff officers work within their specialties
supporting the larger, more complex choice opportunities at
higher levels. Here, the battle group commander will accept
inputs from all functional areas (i.e., Operations, AAW,
ASW, ASU, Weapons, and Engineering) and formulate an overall
decision with regard to a problem within a choice
opportunity in which he must participate in order to develop
an acceptable solution.
As noted in section two of this chapter, these cases
represent clear extreme occurrences of the organizational
decision structure. The battle group commander's
organization, as any other organization, will be seen as a
mix of all of these structures, interdependent and
overlapping in almost every situation. The military staff
member, as well as the commander himself, will allocate his
time and energy to choice situations based on priority,
preference, time goals and objectives.
The preconditions assumed for organizations operating
within the Garbage Can arena are closely met by the battle
group commander's organization. Briefly paralleling these
conditions, it can be seen that the goals and objectives of
the battle group will vary with time or circumstance as the
tactical organization transits from one readiness condition
25

or situation to another. As specific environments are
encountered, the battle group staff will find that stated
organizational goals or procedures are not germane to the
existing situation. Secondly, the means of accomplishing the
goals will not be fully understood or envisioned for these
ambiguous occurrences. Finally, the more ambiguous the goals
or choice opportunities appear to be, the less time staff
decision makers will have to devote to specific problems.
As the information available to the decision makers
increases, they must limit the total amount of time spent on
any one problem, and in many cases, must devote excess
energy to top priority problems, causing further breaks in
the flow of the overall decision process.
If we keep the three preconditions given above in
perspective, the manner in which decisions are made (flight,
oversight, resolution) seems realistic within the battle
group environment. Decisions made by flight are
characterized by the decision maker working with one choice
situation until a problem of a higher priority or more
pressing time limit is realized. The energies devoted to the
original problem will be transferred to the more pressing
situation, with the original problem "kicked downstairs" to
subordinates for resolution, or perhaps considered solved
because it was overcome by events.
Problems solved by oversight in a battle group situation
are best characterized by those occurrences which must be
26

dealt with quickly in a high tempo environment such as a
hot-war or battle situation. Minimum time and energy will
be expended by the commander and staff because of the time
constraint dictated by the situation. Although
consideration of other existing problems is not relevant to
the problem being acted upon, the decision will not be made
with "tunnel vision". The overall tactical picture is
current in the mind of the commander and his subordinates
and will influence any decisions made.
Finally, decisions developed by resolution can be
characterized as those problems which are considered
extremely important to the survival of the battle group or
those problems which are possibly less important and can be
fully staffed at lower levels of the command before being
issued as a directive by the commander. Both of these
situations will usually be developed utilizing guidelines
previously established through Orders of Battle, Operating
Plans or Standard Operating Procedures. Resolution of
important problems is however, based on the assumption that
sufficient time and energy are available to plan and execute
the decided actions. Otherwise, these same problems will be
decided by flight or oversight. Decision maker attention to
decisions will be dictated by what is commonly referred to
as attention mechanisms. These "extensions" or
environmental changes that evoke decision situations are
evident in most, if not all, choice situations facing a
27

battle group or military commander. Included in this
category of environmental stimuli are Triggering, Deadlines,
Secret Deadlines, and Timing.
1 . Triggers
Chester I. Barnard states that occasions for
decisions originate from three sources: superiors,
subordinates and initiative of the individual decision
maker [Ref. 11]. Here, a direct parallel must be considered
between business and the military commander. Triggers can
be identified in all areas of the military decision process.
Direct orders from superiors, inquiries or responses from
subordinates, initiating action derived from the internal
staff organization, as well as enemy actions or responses
are but a few of the triggers that a commander may
implicitly or explicitly originate or perceive. Triggers in
the military environment can effect the decision process in
varying degrees. If originated by an individual, other
higher priority problem areas or choice situations will
invariably be put aside so as to investigate the event that
has been triggered. If this is done in a self-serving manner
by a superior, tactical (realtime) decision situations will
suffer. Accordingly, triggers which continuously occur
external to the organization, will tend to have the same
effect on on-going tactical situations but are much easier
to filter or control through proper staff organization.
Filtering and control of triggers is important, but in a
28

military environment, all triggering events must be
considered, due to the possible influence they may exert on
the operational aspects of the battle forces.
2 . Deadlines
Deadlines may be set (or defined) by individuals or
circumstances (within and outside the organization).
Deadlines serve to cue or direct attention to those choices
and problems subject to deadlines and divert attention away
from choices and problem situations not affected by
deadlines. Deadlines within the decision process can
provide a measure of which choice opportunities or problems
must be acted upon immediately, and which are of a secondary
importance (or lesser deadline) [Ref. 4: p. 226]. Deadlines
under ambiguous conditions are explained by March and Olsen
[Ref. 4: p. 226] as existing for two reasons:
a. Deadlines may be ambiguous with regard to the
problems that must be considered with a given choice.
b. Deadlines may be ambiguous with regard to the date
of a deadline. The effectiveness of the deadline many
diminish if there is uncertainty associated with the
deadline date.
If deadlines are to be effective they must be
enforceable and certain. The military commander is faced
with deadlines in every aspect of his decision process.
They are imposed by seniors and the military environment in
which he operates. As with the triggering phenomenon,
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deadlines can effect decision maker participation in choice
situations. As a firm deadline is approached, attention is
diverted from other problems or choice situations to the
event which has increased in priority due to the attached
deadline. An example of this within the battle group
decision process would be plans to monitor ship movements
and locations being set aside in order to recover aircraft.
Here, we have an established deadline based on aircraft
available fuel or weather conditions. Participant energy
and attention would be diverted from the initial situation
until the aircraft were recovered. But what if the course
to recover aircraft took the ship out of range in which to
monitor the ship movements, as proposed in the earlier plan?
Problems could arise causing severe tactical or strategic
consequences. As can be imagined, deadlines must be managed
carefully. The battle group commander, as well as his
staff, must constantly maneuver within the tactical
environment through the manipulation of events or
occurrences and their own attached deadlines. Deadlines
require and receive more time and energy than would be
available or necessary if faced with a normal decision
situation. If a deadline were perceived as a "soft
deadline" by the decision maker (or staff) when it was in
fact "hard", an anomaly known as a "secret deadline" occurs.
In a tactical sense once this secret deadline is realized,
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reaction by the staff must be immediate with enormous
amounts of energy made available to act upon the decision.
The military decision environment was described at
length in this chapter to demonstrate that the Garbage Can
model provides a framework for understanding decision
processes at the battle group commander level. The
following chapters provide simulation trials, based on field




In this chapter, we will briefly describe the flag staff
organization, identify specific categories of flag
decisions, describe the sources of information available to
the flag staff, and pattern the flow of information in a
modern battle group. The emergence of the Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) concept as an organizational standard has
provided fleet commanders with a tool to accomplish the
decentralization of responsibility and authority within a
battle group. It is this structured organization which
identifies specific responsibilities to certain decision
makers and thus, makes numerical evaluation of the process
possible in a garbage can arena. A brief description of the
CWC organization will serve to identify the players and
their roles.
In the CWC organization, command and control is
distributed functionally, and may be distributed physically
as well. Various responsibilities for different aspects of
a battle group's operations are allocated to specific
element coordinators and commanders in a well defined
manner. As a result of pre-planning, or more often because
of a specific decision during hostilities, the degree of
decentralization and delegation of authority can vary from
time to time in response to the situation. Examples include
32

a change in the rules of engagement, the nature of the
threat, the degree of electromagnetic radiation emission
control, and so on. The general trend is a move away from
centralized control by the battle group commander in
quiescent periods to delegated control, consistent with
plans for action and tactics developed and rehearsed in
advance, to specific warfare element commanders. Indeed, as
communications integrity deteriorates in a given conflict,
prior assignment of specific warfare responsibilities
becomes mandatory [Ref. 1: p. 4].
Each area warfare commander must be provided with
information if he is to carry out his duties. Each
commander requires a somewhat different subset of all the
information available, but it is not true that each requires
only the information directly relevant to his own arena of
operations. Effective command and control of the battle
group requires that each warfare area commander must know
what other warfare area commanders are doing relevant to his
decisions. It is this aspect of responsible decision making
that has complicated the design and development of decision
support systems for military operations in a given
operational environment. Our current sensor systems have
evolved to very near real-time data input devices and the
resultant need for evaluated and correlated data is real.
This has become the driving force behind the development of
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an automated decision support system for operational
control
.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF FLAG DECISIONS
Flag level decisions can be grouped into three general
categories of decision types; i.e., planning, execution, and
evaluation [Ref. 5: p. 18]. These three categories
transcend different decision environments and mirror battle
group operations.
Planning decisions are those usually relevant to the
construction of a flag officer's operation order and are
made within the time frame of a few days to several months,
with large amounts of very good information which typically
cover a large number of contingencies.
Execution decisions begin as soon as ships leave port.
Critical here, as related by almost every flag officer
interviewed is that the major emphasis of the flag officer
shifts from operational planning to ensuring that the
operation proceeds as planned. The process of how decisions
are reached for problem situations not covered in the
contingency section of the operation order are of specific
interest to us. Time will be an important factor here as
delays in the decision process may cause important losses.
The decisions may contain a degree of uncertainty and risk
as they are dependent upon, among other factors, the
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timeliness and accuracy of the supporting information [Ref.
2 : p . 3 8].
Evaluation decisions include those made immediately
following the first engagement and pertain to the assessment,
of losses for the battle group and the extent of damage
inflicted on the enemy. From these decisions, planning for
the follow-on attack and formation of new operations or
strikes may begin. Solutions relative to pertinent problems
may assume different weights or levels of acceptability and
other options may become unacceptable alternatives. By
closely examining the decisions of a battle group commander
and reviewing the options available or readily known at the
time, decisions fall into four typical categories: routine,
priority, strategic and "shoot-don't shoot".
Routine decisions are those largely administrative in
nature, concerning general steaming orders, orders to
attached forces concerning support services, and so on.
They are typified by those decisions made in a near perfect
information environment, under little time pressure or
constraint, and generally define command attitude or policy.
Priority decisions are those decisions which have an up-
front, often pressing time constraint and concern the
actions of own forces, without regard to international
effects or ramifications. Operation order changes and




Strategic decisions concern those pressing operational
constraints of an international nature. Typically, these
decisions are surrounded by large amounts of information,
and impact on several areas of concern, namely long and
short range goals.
Shoot-Don't Shoot decisions are those real-time, hot war
decisions concerning weapons employment. Characteristical-
ly, these decisions initially follow planning documents,
operation orders, rules of engagement, and naval tactical
memos. But as a given situation in a particular theater
deteriorates, guidelines become less definitive as the
quality of communications worsens and the reliability of
information available to the battle group commander
plummets
.
The net sum of examining categories and characteristics
of a battle group commander's decision process is that
individual options can be identified for numerical
identification and manipulation. A graphic representation
of the overlap of decision characteristics and categories
shows the relationship between each:
* ROUTINE * PRIORITY * STRATEGIC * SHOOT/ DON'T SHOOT
* * * *
*****************************************************
* * * *
* I evaluation I
* I execution I
*
*I planning I
Figure 1 . Decision Characteristics and Categories
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The cumulative nature of the process tends to be
cyclical in operation; i.e., the evaluation phase ultimately
culminates in routine planning changes. But the process
under study is the flag decision process and some
observations of that process should be made due to their
importance in the modeling process.
1. Flag level decisions tend to be non- repe t i t i ve.
Repetitive decisions are usually delegated to staff
members or subordinate commanders.
2. General policy and force attitude are set by the flag
commander.
3. Timing of most flag level decisions is important and
the consequences of bad timing can be devastating.
Guidelines covering as many contingencies as possible
serve to reduce decision error in emergency situations
and reduce the time necessary to reach a given
decision. The next step in the analysis process is to
examine the types of information and input available
to a battle group commander.
The information flowing to the Command Center must be of
high quality and timely in nature. Information flowing to
the battle group commander is of two specific types:
tactical and strategic. This classification is advantageous
because the two types are handled in different manners;
tactical information is generally considered to be of a more
immediate nature and presents a real-time picture of the
current battle situation, whereas strategic information is
not often of immediate importance, but should be considered
in forward planning [Ref. 5: p. 22]. Many factors including
national interests pursuits, global politics, and mission
purpose will impact which category is appropriate for a
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given bit of information. As weapon systems continue to
evolve toward an increased effective range, battle group
commanders must become concerned about damage to the battle
group at greater distances from the enemy; the effect is a
shift toward an increase in tactical information at the
expense of strategic information. The net effect of the
shift is to increase the number of factors and variables




IV. DATA COLLECTION AND MODELING PROCESS INPUT
The modeling concept as developed in the previous
chapters has been further supported and tested by us through
"realtime" data collection and the application of a unique
modeling concept developed by Dr. Daniel L. Guinier at the
Naval Postgraduate School. The purpose of this chapter is
to discuss the data source, data collection and model input
of the data. Of particular importance in this chapter is
the method by which decision makers, problems and choice
situations were identified and prepared for input to the
model. The actual simulation findings derived from this
model will be discussed in the three remaining chapters.
The data used for input for this modeling simulation were
collected during SEACON 84-1, conducted at the Center for
Wargaming, Newport, Rhode Island, from 10-18 November, 1983.
This wargame was developed to allow senior DOD officials to
participate in a military decision making environment.
Participation in the wargame was further supplemented by the
Carrier Group One Staff, RADM P.F. McCarthy, commanding.
Additional support was provided by experienced officers from
all the services who participated in the wargame in those




The game situation was developed as an open ocean fleet
engagement between two superpowers which escalated from a
"cold war" environment through various stages of
hostilities, to a full scale, wartime confrontation. We
were placed in a unique position within the game structure
to facilitate the data collection and verification process
with which to gather data for input into the Garbage Can
Process simulation. We were assigned within the command
structure of the Blue force staff as officers in charge of
the Bravo Whiskey (Anti Air Warfare Commander) and Bravo
Sierra (Surface Warfare Commander) command modules. This
arrangement allowed us to not only witness the process, but
to participate in the decision arena as well. Data were
accumulated on a daily basis from the module logs and from
our own "realtime" observations of the Blue Force Command
decision process. Additionally, the Center for Wargaming
(specifically Commander Dick Adams) provided a complete
package of data generated from the game in the form of ( 1 )
all messages generated by the various command modules (2) a
complete track history of all forces and (3) engagement
reports generated from the game floor. This extensive data
source combined with our observations from a player's
viewpoint, provided a perspective of the various decisions
at all levels of command as well as the decision processes
which supported the commanders' actions throughout the
wargame. The complete data package was screened and broken
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down into selected data boundaries which could be used as
data input for the Garbage Can Modeling simulation. This
data was refined under the direction of Dr Guinier and run
on a Vax 11/780 at the Naval Postgraduate School. These





Ten (10) decision makers, representing ten key decision
making positions within the wargaming hierarchy, were
identified. Clear choice opportunities (6) as well as their
attendant problems (20) were matched with these specific
decision makers to exemplify the decision arena that was to
be utilized within the representative modeling simulation.
The data input required by the methodology, in support of
the simulation was segmented every thirty (30) minutes, or
twice an hour. These time periods were further represented
by the twenty-eight (28) time periods that are used by the
simulation to denote problem entry times. The specific data
items drawn from the wargame for use in the modeling
simulation are presented with summary representations. This
is done to provide an insight into the methodology and
justification of the process utilized to develop the data
input to the model.
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A. DECISION MAKER ASSIGNMENT
All decision makers are present throughout the
simulation. Although they move from one choice to another,
they remain within the decision arena throughout the
wargame. They are listed below in ranking of importance to
the decision process, which is itself identified by the




D1 - RADM P.F. McCarthy
RADM McCarthy is presently Commander Carrier Group
One (COMCARGRU ONE). During the wargame (SEACON 1-84) he
acted as Commander, Task Force 30 in overall command of the
two Battle Groups, Task Group 30.1 and Task Group 30.2. Key
members of RADM McCarthy's staff are noted as individual
decision makers, as they provided key inputs and decision
support within the identified choice and problem
identification process.
2 . D2 - Captain Ward
Capt Ward is presently chief of Staff, COMCARGRU
ONE. He acted in the same capacity during the wargame as
Chief of Staff, Commander Task Force 30. Capt Ward's
extensive experience in submarines and anti-submarine
warfare was tantamount to his being identified as a key





D3/D4 - Commander Phillips
_/ Commander Lovett
Cdr Phillips and Cdr Lovett are experienced aviators
with air operations and anti-submarine warfare backgrounds.
Both are attached to COMCARGRU ONE Staff and acted in a
similar capacity during the wargames. The nature of the
threat, that is, Red Air and Red Force submarines well
justified the choice of these two officers as key decision
makers
.
4 . D5 - Captain Lewis
Captain Lewis is an experienced Surface Warfare
Officer with extensive service in both surface ships and
Staff positions. He is presently attached to the staff of
COMCARGRU ONE. As Commander, Task Group 30.2 for the
wargame, he was responsible for the decisions and actions
within Task Group 30.2 as defined by existing choices and
problem situations.
5 . D6_ - Lieutenant Commander Buletza
Lcdr Buletza acted as Deputy, Commander Task Group
30.1 ( CV Battle Group A) during the wargame. He was the
principal advisor to the Battle Group Commander for all
matters effecting the ALPHA (A) Battle Group.
6. D7/D8 - Lieutenant Birdwell and Lieutenant Com m ander
Lillard
LT Birdwell / Lcdr Lillard (the authors) acted as
surface ship and anti-air warfare commanders for Task Force
30.2. Both have extensive experience aboard Guided Missile
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Cruiser and Destroyer type ships which provided credibility
to their positions as decision makers in support of overall
force defense.
7. D9 - Commander D.A. Clark
Commander Clark is an experienced Surface Warfare
Officer currently enroute to assume the duties as commanding
officer of a FFG-7 class destroyer. During the wargame he
acted as CTF30.1, Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander for the
Bravo Battlegroup.
8. D1 - Lieutenant Commander A Gideon USN
Lcdr A. Gideon, is an experienced nuclear submarine
officer. He acted as deputy to the Commander Task Group
30.1, Anti-submarine (subsurface) Warfare Commander.
B. CHOICES [6] AND PROBLEMS [20]
The choice situations are listed and utilized within the
model in the order in which they occurred. The same
choices, if listed in order of importance, would be
identified as choice 1, 6, 3, 4, 2 and 5, respectively.
Problems that are attached to the choices are numbered in
the order in which they occurred. Choice situations and
their attendant problems were identified, on an attentive
basis throughout the wargame and substantiated through BLUE
force intentions meetings, held twice daily by the
Commander, Task Force 30 (RADM McCarthy). Upon completion
of the wargame, the six choices and attached problems were
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chosen from an inclusive list developed over the course of
events of the past week. Specifically, the following
determinants were used to select the choice situations
implemented within the model:
1. Which particular event(s) created the choice situa-
tion with the greatest overall threat to the Blue force?
2. Which specific event(s) created the choice situation
that would result in the greatest potential loss of life
and/or material to the Blue forces?
3. Which specific event (s) created the choice situation
that presented the greatest loss of political posture to the
Blue forces?
4. Which event(s) created the choice situation that
represented the highest potential damage to Blue force
intelligence, and subsequently, the greatest loss of Blue
force security?
5. Which event(s) created the choice situation that
would adversely affect routine Battle Group operations
resulting in a reduction in the overall mission
effectiveness of Blue forces?
This listing was discussed with the key decision makers
and staff of COMCARGRU ONE with the following list developed
as those choice situations and problems which played key
roles in determining the strategic outcome of the wargame.
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1 . Choice #1
Should the Task Force go out of EMCON following the
overflight by RED force reconnaissance? If the force has
been identified, further EMCON procedures could have a
negative effect on the task force readiness posture.
However, if the force has not been identified, breaking
EMCON could indicate the BLUE force location and disposition
to the RED forces. Choice #1 was noted as the most important
of the six choices. From a strategic standpoint, the
overflight by Red aircraft posed a significant threat to the
force. As in World War II, the location of friendly forces
must remain unknown to the enemy. An allied Commander must
be able to strike the enemy on his own terms. Early
detection of friendly forces by the enemy would allow for
timely targeting procedures by surveillance craft as well as
a first strike opportunity against the main body of friendly
forces
.
Problems 1-4 are attached to choice #1 as follows:
1 . Internal pressure is present within the task force to
come out of EMCON. (Subordinate Staffs)
2. Internal pressure is present to stay in present EMCON
plan. (Subordinate Staffs)
3. There is a perceived need to revise the EMCON status
of the BLUE forces. (Subordinate Staffs)
4. There is a perceived need to develop a contingency




These problems are closely related to the content of
the various actions which must be developed to act on the
problems and the method in which the problems need to be
resolved. The internal pressures present within the staff
and subordinate commands with which these problems were
associated were noted through the message traffic, voice
communications and the daily commanders' briefings. Problem
2 was eventually attached to choice 2 and measures to solve
the EMCON dilemma were effected in the context of this
problem. Solution of this problem presented by the staff
was borne out as correct through the RED force message
traffic which was reviewed after the wargame.
2. Choice £2
A strike against the RED force must be considered by
the Task Force Commander. The Surface Group Commander and
the Anti-air Warfare Commander feel that intelligence is not
accumulating quickly enough to allow for a sustained, well
developed strike based on intelligence which may become
available in the future. This choice situation was noted as
the fifth priority item of the six choices presented. The
assumptions developed here are not of immediate consequence
but are strategically important for the long range survival
of the Blue forces. A strike must be planned, but when it
will take place is strategically important and cannot be
decided too quickly. Intelligence on the overall Red force
position and intention was developing too slowly in light of
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the recent escalation of hostilities by the Red nations.
The Blue force required a strike plan and an opportune time
to execute it.
Problems 15-17 are attached to Choice #2 as follows:
15. Unclear and ambiguous information is developed
concerning the intentions of the RED forces. (Blue
Intelligence
)
16. Internal pressure is exerted to strike the RED forces
in strength. (Subordinate Staffs)
17. There is a probable high loss of BLUE aircraft with
an air strike.
These problems have attached themselves to this
choice by virtue of the deteriorating strategic situation
and the various force commanders 1 desire to take action
before the enemy strikes. The overall problem is
exacerbated through the unclear and ambiguous information
that has been received in regard to the RED force
disposition. The problem of high loss of aircraft during a
strike is a given outcome of any action against the enemy.
Whether lost in action against the enemy during a strike or
in defense of the force, aircraft will be lost. The problem
of the offered air strike plan is accepted and acted upon by
the Task Force Commander after review of all associated
problems at the Commanders' intentions meeting.
3 . Choice #_3
Blue Forces must preclude compromise and
intelligence data loss following the capture of a BLUE
intelligence ship by the RED Battle Group. This choice
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situation forced the Task Force Commander to weigh the
problems of how to deal with this situation in terms of
intelligence compromise weighed against the loss of BLUE
force life. This choice situation was first noted in the
message traffic from BLUE intelligence reports and
substantiated through aircraft voice reports. The choice
situation was noted by the combined decision maker hierarchy
as being the third in order of importance to the overall
wargame strategy on the part of the Blue forces. Although
the compromise of Blue intelligence data and possible force
position was in jeopardy the situation was somewhat
controllable. Continuous voice situation reports were
relayed to the Blue Force Commander from a Blue
reconnaissance aircraft on station at the scene of the
capture. Through constant monitoring of data transmissions
from the Red forces in the area, Blue intelligence was able
to ascertain any transmission of sensitive data.
Problems 9-11 are attached to choice #3 as follows:
9. The Force Commander must weigh the probabilities of
the BLUE loss of life against the compromise of
intelligence data.
10. Pressure is exerted within the staff to sink the
captured BLUE intelligence ship. (Subordinate Staffs
--message and voice transmission)
11. Pressure is exerted by subordinate commanders to
rescue the BLUE intelligence ship and crew.
(Intelligence Staff and message transmission)
The problems presented to the Task Force Command
structure by this choice situation were to become evident
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during the Task Group Commander's meetings and through the
message traffic to COMBLUE. The problems required diverse
actions to accomplish desired ends. Eventually, after
weighing all problems presented under this choice situation,
the problem of sinking the intelligence ship was considered
to be a "least cost" situation to the Commander and Staff.
All hands were lost with the sinking of the intelligence
ship and its captors. This appeared to be the best choice -
problem situation as the RED forces did not know the
disposition of the BLUE forces or their intentions until the
end of the wargame.
4. Choice
_#4
A RED force intelligence ship is in a position to
collect data on the BLUE Battle Group. This key choice
situation, again, describes the importance placed on
possible targeting of the BLUE forces. If the position of
the Battle Groups were defined, the fate of the BLUE forces
would be "sealed". The RED intelligence ship was
intercepted by BLUE reconnaissance aircraft and tracked by
the "picket" ship radars. This choice situation was defined
by the decision makers as number four priority in relation
to the six choice situations noted in the wargame. Although
this intelligence ship was capable of gathering information
as to the position of the Blue Forces and providing
targeting data to other Red units, there was no indication
that it had the opportunity to do so yet. The Blue force
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commander considered this an important event, but one which
could be dealt with in a more deliberate manner than choice
1, 6, or 3. This reasoning developed from the assumption
that if the Red reconnaissance craft had not gathered any
sensitive information, destroying it would bring attention
to its location which was within missile range of the Blue
Force.
Problems 12-14 are attached to choice #4:
12. Targeting data on BLUE forces may be available to RED
Forces from the RED intelligence ship. (Blue
Intelligence
)
13. Pressure within the BLUE staff and subordinate
commands is exerted to sink the RED intelligence
ship. (Subordinate Staffs)
14. An Air strike against the intelligence ship could
indicate to the RED force the BLUE force location.
(Blue Intelligence Staff)
These problems are directed toward the choice
situation by the need to keep the position of the BLUE force
from RED intelligence gathering units. The various problems
were presented to the staff relating to this choice
situation through the message traffic from BLUE intelligence
and the various warfare commanders responsible for BLUE
force defense. These problems were viewed within the
perspective of the current BLUE strategy concerning force
passive defense. Again, attachment of the problem which
would be developed into an action (sinking) against the




A RED force submarine is suspected to be hiding
beneath an unidentified merchant vessel. This choice
situation was defined by the BLUE force Surface Warfare
Commander and confirmed through the lack of firm
intelligence concerning the problem of the position of the
unknown RED force submarine. If the submarine is beneath
the merchant, the merchant may be providing targeting data
to the submarine. This choice situation was considered the
lowest priority of those within the wargame model. Here a
"what if" scenario was developed within various subordinate
staffs of the Blue force commander. As during any conflict
at sea, any unidentified craft must be considered hostile
until intelligence dictates otherwise. This, coupled with
the fact that Blue intelligence was unable to note the
position of a red missile firing submarine, provided the
"backdrop" for a potentially dangerous and costly situation
for the Blue Force. Additionally, the utilization of a
merchant for disguising the location of a submarine is a
ruse used by submarine forces throughout the world. Thus,
this scenario provided many staff members with the
opportunity to devise a "textbook solution" to counter the
threat.
Problems 18-20 attached to choice #5:
18. There is ambiguous RED submarine intelligence.
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19. An unidentified merchant ship may be providing cover
for a RED force submarine.
20. A RED Force submarine's location is unaccounted for.
These problems developed through the lack of BLUE
intelligence reports in the message traffic concerning
submarine locations and the feeling of insecurity felt by
the BLUE force commanders when the merchant was sighted by
BLUE aircraft. Additionally, BLUE intelligence was unable
to account for the merchant steaming so close to the BLUE
main body of ships. The various actions against this
supposed threat were discussed in the message traffic as
well as in the Commanders' intentions meetings. It was
decided that the best course of action was to sink the
merchant as a safeguard measure. Unfortunately, the
merchant turned out to be a BLUE force hospital ship.
6 . Choice £6
The deception group's mission effectiveness is
suspect in view of recent BLUE intelligence reports. Choice
#6 was decidedly the second most important choice situation
which occurred during the wargame. The deception mission
charged to these units, if effective, is extremely important
from the standpoint of deceiving the enemy as to the
location of the Blue force. This deception admittedly
places the deception group in danger, but the strategic
importance of the intelligence gathered by the force as well
as the tactical advantage which can be gained by diverting a
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strike away from the main body of the Blue forces justified
the risk. Conversely, as mentioned above, if the deception
group were discovered as to its mission and unit strength by
the Red reconnaissance overflight, valuable air, subsurface
and surface assets would be lost to the Blue force.
Ambiguous Red intelligence reports which were intercepted by
Blue intelligence did not indicate if the deception group
was discovered or not. Instead, their ambiguous wording
created turmoil within the Blue force as to whether the
intercepted messages were intentionally provided to the Blue
intelligence sources.
Problems 5-8 are attached to choice #6:
5. There is a possible compromise of the BLUE deception
group by a RED Reconnaissance flight. (Blue Deception
Force -Message)
6. Intelligence is unclear as to the deception groups
mission success. (Blue Intelligence)
7. A RED Force intelligence message is intercepted by
BLUE intelligence. (Blue Intelligence)
8. Internal pressure is exerted with the BLUE Force Staff
and subordinate commanders to cancel deception
operations. (Subordinate Staffs - Voice Transmission)
The problems that are attached to this choice
situation are important for several different but related
reasons. A decision as to employment of the deception group
is extremely important as to their effectiveness as a
deception tool and their force utilization as an active BLUE
force asset within the force screen. The overflight by RED
aircraft is confirmed by the deception group but neither the
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deception group nor BLUE intelligence can confirm an actual
sighting. The receipt of a RED message by all BLUE units
stating that the BLUE force location was unknown could be a
ruse. The overall ambiguous information concerning the
deception group adds to the internal pressures to have the
Task Force Commander retrieve the deception group. As it
turned out, the "pressure groups" were wrong. The Task
Force Commander decided to let the group remain on their
deception mission, and , as was later indicated by message






Version 5 of the original Fortran model, introduced by
Cohen, March and Olsen in 1972, was a non-interactive, batch
oriented process which read entry times for choices,
solution coefficients, problems, and two control variables
from a separate data file. The nature of the problem and
the need to provide a highly interactive process led to
modification of version 5. Dr. Daniel Guinier of the Naval
Postgraduate School finished construction of such a model in
January, 1 984. It is this model which was used to evaluate
the data described in the preceding chapter. The major
computational algorithms remain unchanged from the original
version. Changes from the original version do however,
include an interactive routine to permit user input and
desired output to be read from the console. Also new are
expanded input matrices which provide space for a maximum of
100 problems, choices, decision makers and entry times.
Energy is held constant for each "step" in the summary
statistics output to allow comparison of data in a
quantifiable manner. Each of the four variables (load,
decision structure, access structure and energy
distribution), is exercised in three different modes
resulting in the 81 "steps". The model handles solutions by
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using a "solution coefficient" for each separate entry time
which was held constant for the control case under study.
The simulation is exercised by having the aforementioned
variables interact in a system run, permitting observations
to be made. Utilizing the data obtained from Seacon 84-1
,
and our own personal experience of actual at-sea battle
group involvement, we have been able to produce data which
we believe to be of significant value in the evaluation of
the Garbage Can concept for possible use as a kernel in the
construction of a battle group commander's decision support
system.
The theory of the Garbage Can model focuses on two
primary attributes, as previously described: decision maker
attention, and flows and timing of decisions, problems and
solution alternatives within an organization. [Ref : 6] The
questions a decision maker faces in deciding which problems
to address and the amount of energy to devote to each one
are non-trivial, especially under ambiguous conditions. In
a traditional sense, problems surface and decision makers
address them by seeking appropriate solutions. But in this
model, problems, choice opportunities, choices, decision
makers, and solutions all circulate independently of one
another. A brief set of program features follows:
1 . MATRIX SIZE: The situation under study is limited to
100 decision makers, 100 problems, 100 solutions, 100




2. LANGUAGE UTILIZED: The re-coding effort was made in
FORTRAN-77 with a high degree of machine independence
in mind.
3. INPUT FLEXIBILITY: The user of the system is allowed
to enter data from the console directly or to have
data read from a previously created file. Also,
output modifications are prompted at the conclusion of
input requirements.
All decision makers remain in the arena for all time
periods. Choices enter the system one per time period for
the specified number of time periods; problems enter the
arena two per time period for the time periods specified.
Both become inactive as choices are made. Here, solutions
are modeled using a single coefficient from 0.0 to 1.0,
rather than as a specific matrix entity and thus, affords a
great deal of flexibility in determining the viability of
the model for military application. The importance of the
coefficient and its impact on this investigative effort is
detailed in the last chapter.
The three decision structures ( u ns eg m e nt ed
,
hierarchical, and specialized), were simulated as in the
original model by the creation of three computational
matrices. Choices and decision makers are ranked from most
to least important as the number of each increases from one.
The relationship between problems and choices in the access
matrices is functionally identical. As previously
described, a similar relationship could be constructed for
solutions, but we would lose a valuable analysis tool (in
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the solution coefficient) and gain little more than a model
greatly increased in complexity.
Here, energy is associated with our decision makers and
the problems to which they must attend. The relationship
reflects the on-going competition for attention between
decision makers and problems [Ref 6], Each decision maker is
given 5.5 units of energy per time period, which may be
distributed in three different ways; increasing from 0.1 to
1.0, equally distributed at 0.55, and decreasing from 1.0 to
0.1. These are represented in the model as "-", " = ", and
"+", respectively. These three energy distributions
represent the three generalizations of organizational
structure [Ref. 1], If we consider the most general case,
where all decision makers bring the same energy to a choice
situation, we see that less important decision makers are
given an opportunity to significantly contribute energy to
the can due to the large amount of time available to them,
and that important decision makers, although constrained by
time limits placed upon them, contribute shorter intervals
of "quality" time. The "quality" here is due to the
important decision maker's experience and accumulated
intelligence.
Given that a decision maker or problem is permitted to
enter a choice situation, as dictated by the appropriate
matrix, attention will be directed toward choices nearest
completion or toward choice opportunities with the highest
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expected return. A choice is made whenever sufficient
energy is present. That sufficiency is determined from the
energy distribution at the time and the applied solution
coefficient; it must be at least equal to the indicated
energy requirement .of the total can.
Data are entered in response to user friendly,
interactive system prompts. Upon completion of data input,
the user is asked for his output desires and is given
several options, ranging from an abbreviated summary
statistics format to a full-blown, step-by-step data history
of the modeling process which provides the user with a
graphic representation of the computational matrices for
each of the 81 steps.
With data collected and made ready for input to the
model, all that remained was to exercise the program and
collect the output. The next chapter deals with the output





Data, as collected and previously described, were
entered and run on a DEC Vax 11/780. By far, the most
interesting results were obtained from those steps involving
the Specialized/Unsegmented access/choice matrix structure.
This particular structure affords the highest probability of
attaining those characteristics considered most desirable in
an operational battle group environment. Similar results
were obtained independently by Anderson and Fisher
(Carnegie-Mellon University) and echoed in their
presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School Joint Workshop
on Decision Making in Military Organizations, Monterey,
California, January 26-28, 1984 [Ref. 12: p. 10]. In Dr.
Anderson's presentation, particular attention was given to
the "tree hierarchy". We believe this concept to be closely
tied to the CMO "specialized hierarchy", only modified to
include specifically defined alternatives. This concept was
echoed by Kathleen Carley in her presentation at the same
workshop [Ref. 13: p. 7], Her treatment of the subject was
to provide some mechanism for overlap on the part of the
separate entities concerned; i.e., access and decision
structures. She did this by modifying the specialized
hierarchy to include a constant weighting factor and to
ultimately produce what she termed a "semi- spec ia li zed
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hierarchy". We believe both ideas to be of the same general
nature; overlap does in fact occur in the decision process.
Given the precondition of unclear goals, ambiguous
information and fluid participation, the Specialized/
Unsegmented matrix produces the highest level of problem
solution by resolution and the lowest occurrences of
unsolved problems and wasted energy. Although the mean
number of decisions not made in the S/U matrix was somewhat
larger than most of the other categories, it is our feeling
that the Navy organization benefits more from solving
problems than from simply making decisions.
The selection of these three summary statistics from the
total output was a non-trivial task. The model provides
summary statistics in areas not utilized in this study; the
six summary statistics not utilized in our computations are
the total number of Active Choice periods (ACp), Changes by
decision Makers (CdM), Changes by Problems (C/P), Latent
Problem periods (LPp), attached Problem periods (aPp), and
periods Decision makers resting (pDr). Active choice
periods and latent problem periods are an important
microdivis ion of the available information and are most
probably valuable in a study of the particulars of a given
matrix manipulation, but provide no additional information
toward the evaluation of a specific matrix hierarchy.
Changes by decision makers and problems may be interesting
should the investigation include a prediction of optimum
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solution coefficient values or a study of decision maker
movement. The number of attached problem periods might
provide an interesting input to a study of solution
attractiveness or effectiveness. We find the number of
periods when decision makers rested to be of little value.
Although these are interesting sources of information, we
felt their inclusion to be an unnecessary complication given
the scope of this investigation; i.e., "given the results of
a quantifiable run, which matrix hierarchy solves the
largest number of problems, wasting the least amount of
energy?"
.
Based on numerous flag officer interviews and an
exhaustive literature survey, the high overload and low
decision maker slack typical of a battle group environment,
forces decision makers to make decisions, to solve problems,
and do so with a net conservation of energy. Simply stated,
we seek the structure we believe to be most beneficial to
the Navy organization and most appropriate for utilization
as a logical kernel in the construction of a battle group
commander's decision support system. A summary of the
statistical results obtained from exercising the model with
the data previously described follows in the next section.
A. STATISTICAL FINDINGS
The numerical output of the Guinier modified version of
the CMC- (version five) model was obtained by running the
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SEACON 84-1 data previously described. From the Summary
Statistics, we are given an excellent picture of what has
occurred in the model itself and are able to determine which
of the hierarchy structures affords us optimum results in
terms we can quantify: decisions made or not made, problems
solved or not solved, and wasted energy. A basic assumption
on our part is that the Navy organization benefits from
decisions made (as opposed to decisions not made), from
problems solved (as opposed to those not solved), and from
the elimination of wasted energy—energy which could better
be used in solving additional problems. We believe,
therefore, that the Navy organization will profit by
reducing the number of decisions not made, the number of
problems not solved, and the amount of energy wasted.
A numerical comparison of the three specific means (x)
of the Summary Statistics in Appendix A was made using the
following statistical tools:
SDX = s n _-| = standard deviation
MX = x = average value of x
SX = Sum of x ( ^X)
SX2 = Sum of x squared Z_»(x^ )
N = Data n
SEN = Sn-1 /sqr N




Below is a chart summarizing the findings of the analysis
of the three specific summary statistic means over all loads
for the 81 steps produced in the model run of all nine
hierarchical structures. For reference, the standard
deviation (s n _ ] ) follows each statistic in parentheses:
Table I. Summary Statistics for Means Over All Loads
MATRIX N Decisions Problems Wasted
STRUCTURE not Made not Solved Energy
S/U 9 1.22 (1.20) 5.88 (4.80) 6.41 (3.14)
S/H 9 3.00 (1.65) 10.44 (6.61) 3.18 (2.90)
S/S 9 4.33 (1.50) 12.55 (8.69) 0.67 (0.58)
H/U 9 0.66 (0.50) 10.00 (7.54) 41.92 (23.74)
H/H 9 0.66 (0.50) 11.11 (8.37) 37.20 (26.69)
H/S 9 1.11 (0.33) 18.88 (1.45) 9.40 ( 3.23)
U/U 9 0.66 (0.50) 13.33 (10.00) 71.86 (26.50)
U/H 9 0.88 (0.33) 17.77 (6.66) 54.48 (19.18)
U/S 9 1.00 (0.00) 20.00 (0.00) 16.94 (0.30)
A complete list of program results is listed in Appendix
A. In general, our findings are consistent with the CMO
model. The original model used artificially created data
for the program run. We have used empirical data from a real
military exercise to test and evaluate the model.
Our evaluation began with an analysis of the summary
statistics previously described and a comparison of the
means (x) in each category. The optimum hierarchical
combination was not readily apparent. Even in the S/U
hierarchy, most problems were not solved, some decisions
never were made, and the amount of wasted energy was higher
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than that found in other categories. Also, although a large
number of decisions were made, often the number of problems
not solved remained high. (The reader is directed to an
earlier explanation in this work describing the difference
between decision making and problem solving.) The two would
seem to indicate that the decision process is not always
aimed at problem resolution. We believe this to be
absolutely true. Some problems, by their nature, have no
solutions, but require attached decisions to be made--often
important deci sions- -on a daily basis. The military has
many such problems and they confront our flag officers
frequently.
Another readily observable result concerns load. As the
load in a given hierarchical structure increases, the number
of decisions not made (DnM) and problems not solved (PnS)
increases. Such is to be expected from a given
organization; what was somewhat reassuring in the original
analysis was that as load increased, wasted energy in the
S/U model in fact, decreased from 8.98 to 2.56. The
implication here is that, of the energy available, more was
being used in the attempt to make decisions and solve
problems. The summary statistics in Appendix A show also
that decision maker activity, problem activity, and choice
activity all increased as load increased. One researcher
has addressed this situation by stating that as the density
of choice opportunities increases, decision makers are
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presented with a larger number of choice opportunities from
which to choose. The result is that each opportunity
attracts a smaller number of decision makers. "Because
resolving a choice opportunity requires the agreement of all
those who participate, the fewer the number who attend, the
more likely they will agree on a set of solutions" [Ref. 12:
p. 14].
A number of researchers have begun investigating the
Garbage Can process as a viable model for automating the
decision process. The techniques, modifications and results
have been carefully cataloged and reported, and the
consensus is that, while there are differences between
different models, their cumulative results reflect the
central properties one could reasonably expect from the
original model.
Given the statistical results of the 81 steps, the last
task in identifying the optimum hierarchy matrix was to
perform a routine statistical hypothesis-testing operation
for numerical validity, addressing the system conditions of
independent sampling and normally distributed components.
To accomplish this task, we chose first, to determine the
standard error of the mean (SEN), then to test that number
against its "closest competitor" for significance (given n-1
degrees of freedom) in a standard "Student-t test", and then
to determine the validity of that test, using a standard "F"
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test [Ref. 14: p. 103, Ref. 15: p. 116]. The results of
those tests are summarized in the chart on the next page.
The question under study is a determination of whether
the lower incidence of Problems not Solved, Decisions not
Made, and the smaller amount of Wasted Energy actually
occurs consistently as indicated in our results, or whether
we are looking at an isolated, rare instance. The
hypothesis we propose is that the S/U hierarchy provides the
lowest number of Problems not Solved and Decision not Made,
and results in the smallest amount of Wasted Energy.
Our results show that there is less than a 5% chance of
a Type I statistical error in assuming that hypothesis to be
correct for all categories of comparison, excepting that of
Decisions not Made. Here, the results would indicate that
the Unsegmented and Hierarchical structures perform at least
as well, and often do better than the structure under study.
Note, however, that the total difference in the Decisions
not Made (DnM) does not exceed one decision.
Rather than attempt an analysis of all results for all
steps in the computational process, we have included the




Table II. Statistical Hypothesis - Test Results
Decisions not Made
STRUCTURE DoF SEN t-test F-test
S/U only 8 0.400 N/A N/A
S/U to S/H 16 0.550 6.86 0.529
S/U to H/U 16 0.166 7.05 5.760
S/U to U/U 16 0.166 7.04 5.760
Probl ems not Solved
S/U only 8 1 .6 N/A N/A
S/U to S/H 16 2.203 4.39 0.527
S/U to H/U 16 2.51 3 3.47 0.405
S/U to U/U 16 3.333 4.47 0.230
Wa sted Ene:rgy
S/U only 8 1 .040 N/A N/A
S/U to S/H 16 1 .046 6.55 1.17
S/U to H/U 16 7.913 9.52 0.02










MX = Average (x)
SDXN = Standard deviation (
s
n )
SDX = Standard deviation (sn _-j)
SX = Sum of x (Ex)
SX2 = Sum of x squares ( L. x )
N = Data n


















































TOTAL S/S, ALL loads
MX 4.333










































































































Problem entry time :
2 2 2 2 8 8 9 14 14 14 2 2 2 25 25 25 3 3 4 4
**j***2***3***4***5***6***7***8***9** 10**11** 12** 13** 14**15**16**17**18**19**20
Choice entry time :
2 12 14 13 25 4
*»1***2***3**»4***5***6***7***8***9**10**11**12**13**14**15**16**17**1S**19**20
Solution coefficient :
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
**^***2***3***4***5***6***7***3***9**1 0**11** 12**1 3** 14** 15** 16** 17**18** 19**20
NA* 10* 1 ISTEP= from 1 to
**»****•«•*»«**»..*»««»« + *«**«**«*•*»»***»**•»*»**»»»-»******«*»**«****»»»***
NA=1 : Problems and Decision Makers both move
NA*2 : Decision Makers only move
NA*3 : Problems only move
NA=4 : Neither Problems nor Decision Makers move
ft**-**************************************************************** ************
10*1 : Summary Statistics only






Step by Step Operations






* GARCON : Garbage Can Model of Decision Making *
*************************************************
No :No.of step




DnM :Total Decisions not Made
ACp :Total number of Active choice Periods
CdM :Total number of Changes by decision Makers
PnS :Total number of Problems not Solved
C/P :Total number of Changes by Problems
LPp :Total number of Latent Problem periods
aPp :Total number of attached Problem periods
pDr :Total number of periods of Decision makers resting
UEner:Unused Energy
WEnerrWested Energy
« No Load Acce Deci Ener DnM ACp CdM PnS C/P LPp aPp pDr UEner WEner*
* 1 U U ~ 25 60 91 370 20 7.70 43.77*
* 2 6 u U = 17 90 49 191 100 38.50 17.97*
* 3 u U + 25 60 91 370 20 7.70 48.77*
* 4 u H — 1 27 40 26 68 410 aa 45.99 49.21*
* 5 u H = 16 53 49 6 183 121 46.58 9.88*
* 6 u H + 1 27 40 20 88 410 S8 21.77 70.91*
* 7 (J S ~* 1 27 18 20 88 410 228 86.45 16.59*
* 8 u S = 1 27 18 20 88 410 228 87.78 16.94*
* 9 u S + 1 27 18 20 88 410 228 89.11 17.29*
* 10 H u — 11 70 47 12 91 120 46.20 10.27*
* 11 H u = 10 80 47 12 79 120 46.20 10.27*
* 12 H u + 6 11 70 47 12 91 120 46.20 10.27*
* 13 H H — 28 46 49 12 144 111 51.31 5.16*
• 14 H H = 28 53 47 12 129 129 49.66 6.80*
• IS H H + 21 55 47 12 123 136 48.16 8.31*
• 16 H S ~ 2 55 17 18 70 12 1$0 211 81.97 14.05*
* 17 H S = 1 41 18 16" 72 12" $6} 224 86.24 8.21*
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* 18 H s + 1 46 19 18 78 12 358 211 85.19 15.73*
13 s u — Id 120 1 45 114 58 13o 50.05 3.98*
20 s u = o 16" 120 1 49 114 58 130 50.05 8.58*
21 0" s u + 6 16 . 126 1 4$ 114 58 136 50.05 8.98*
22 s H " 3 6b 61 11 39 114 204 143 69.37 4.66*
23 s H = l 46 64 5 45 114 149 151 58.13 5.78*
24 s H + 6 32 71 1 49 114 105 164 49.70 9.33*
25 s S " 4 73 13 15 35 114 236 155 71.96 0.96*
* 26 s S = 65 18 5 45 114 199 163 64.63 1.54*
• 27 s s + 3 71 15 10 40 110 208 165 67.34 1.56*
* 29 1 u u - i 27 60 2o 33 410 10 3.35 88.55*
* 29 1 u u = 1 27 60 2o 88 410 10 3.35 88.55*
k 30 1 u u ** 1 27 60 20 83 410 10 3.35 88.55*
» 31 1 u H " 1 27 4 20 38 410 38 45.99 49.21*
* 32 i u H = 1 27 40 20 38 410 88 33.88 60.06*
i 33 1 u H f 1 27 40 20 38 410 38 21.77 70.91*
* 34 1 u S ~ 1 27 13 20 98 41C 223 86.45 16.59*
* 35 1 u S = 27 18 26 83 410 228 37. 7fi 16.94*
* 36 1 u S + 1 27 18 20 86 410 228 89.11 17.29*
ft 37 1 H U ' 1 30 90 14 69 12 286 10 . 3.85 57.75*
* 33 1 H U = 1 30 90 14 59 12 286 16 3.85 57.75*
. 39 1 H U + 30 90 14 69 12 286 10 3.85 57.75*
4 40 1 H H — 1 30 43 18 73 12 390 31 13.51 71.42*
<lt 41 1 H H = 1 30 43 18" n 12 390 3l 11.94 71.74*
* 42 1 H H * 1 29 43 16 n 12 334 65 15.05 57.10*
<lr 43 1 H S " 1 30 18 18 82 12 350 235 33.65 9.12*
4k 44 1 H S = 1 31 19 20 96 12 39fl 236 90.86 7.32*
. 45 1 H S 1X 3i 19 26 98" 12 398 236 97.79 8.26*
* 46 1 S u — 1 38 130 5 45 114 13$ So 19.25 7.70*
* 47 1 S u 2 1 38 130 5 45 114 136 50 15.25 7.70*
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* 48 1 S u 1 38 130 5 45 114 136 50 19.25 7.70*
* 49 1 S H " 4 73 67 15 35 114 226 116 61.95 2.33*
1 50 1 s H m 4 71 63 15 35 114 220 13o 50.05 1.67*
* 51 1 s H + 2 62 69 3 41 114 197" 132 36.96 2.96*
• 52" 1 s S — 5 93 11 18 32 110 278 134 66.69 0.23*
* 53 1 s S 5 163" 10 19 32" 110 298 124 47.74 0.13*
* 54 1 s S + 5 91 11 Id 32 110 274 136 50.19 0.23*
* 55 2 u U ~~ 1 27 60 20 88 410 10 3.85 88.55*
* 56 1 u U ~ 1 27 60 20 88 410 10 3.85 88.55*
* 57 2 u U * 1 27 60 2o 88 410 10 3.85 88.55*
* 58 2 u H " i 27 40 20 88 410 88 45.99 49.21*
• 5$ 2 u H ~ 1 21 40 20 88 410 88 33.88 60.06*
* 60 2 u H + 1 27 40 20 88 410 86 21.77 70.91*
• 61 2 u S _ 1 27 18 26 38 410 228 86.45 16.55*
• 62 1 u s = 1 27 18 20 88 410 228 87.78 16.94*
* 63 2 u s + 1 27 18 20 88 410 228 89.11 17.29*
I 64 2 H u ~" 1 32 90 16 72 12 344 1C 3.95 57.75*
* 65 2 H u 3 1 32 90 16 72" 12 344 10 3.S5 57.75*
* 66 2 H u 1 32 90 16 72 12 344 10 3.85 57.75*
* 67 2 H H ~ 1 29 43 16 79 a 334 65 35.00 29.40*
1 £8" 2 H H = 1 29 43 16 79 a 334 65 25.03 38.12*
• 69 2 H H + 1 29 43 16" 79 12 334 65 15.05 46.63*
* 70" 2 H S — 1 31 19 20 98 12 398 236 83.93 6.37*
« 71 2 H s = 1 31 19 20 38 12 398 236 90.86 7.32*
. 72 2 H s 1 31 19 20 98 12 398 236 97.79 8.26*
* 7"3 2 S u — 3 52 120 13 37 114 183 30 11.55 3.85*
* 74 2 s u = 2 49 130 9 41 114 172 30 11.55 0.00*
* 75 2 s u + 3 52 120 13 37 114 183 30 11.55 3.85*
* 76 2 s H ~ 5 82 44 18 32 110 256 111 55.44 0.00*
* 77 2 s H 3 4 75 S3" 15 35 114 231 115 44.27 0.39*
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* 78 2 S H + 4 74 63 15 35 114 228 117 31.92 2.17*
* 79 2 S S ' 5 101 11 18 32 110 294 126 55.09 0.70*
* 80 2 s S = 6 104 10 20 3o lio 300 124 47.74 0.00*




1. Lawson, J.S., "The Art and Science of Military Decision
Making", M il itar y Operat ions Research Societ y , June,
1982.
-----
2. Athens, A., Weissinger-Baylon, R., "Attention Mechanisms
in Garbage Can Decision Making Processes", an
unpublished paper, Naval Postgraduate School, June,
1983.
3. Cohen, M.D., March, J.G., Olsen, J. P., "Garbage Can of
Organization Choice",Admi ni st ra ti ve Sc ienc e Q uarter ly ,
March, 1972.
4. March, J.G., Olsen, J. P., A m b i. g_ ui_ t y_ and Choice i_n
Or gani za tion , Bergen, Norway, Univer si te ts forlaget
,
1979.
5. Allen, H.E., Rannells, D.A., Examination of Battle Group
Com m ande r Deci si on P roce sses and S upport I nfor ma tion
,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June, 1982.
6. Teates, H. B., "The Role of Decision Support Systems in
Command and Control", Signal
,
vol. 37, no. 1, September,
1982.
7. Galbraith, J.R., "Organization Design: An Information
Processing View," Inst itut e of M anag ement Sc iences
:
Interfaces , vol. 4, no. 3, May, 19 74.
8. Boyer B. , Toward a Theory of Mi li tary Deci sion Ma king
,
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, August,
1983.
9. Yates, J.F., Zukowski, L.G., "Characteristics of Ambig-
uity in Decision Making", Behavioral Sc ienc e, vol.21
,
no. 1, January, 1976.
10. Lawson, J.S. "Examining the Garbage Can Model," an
unpublished paper, Naval Electronic Systems Command,
February, 1983.
11. Barnard, C.I., The Functions of the Ex e c u _t i_v e
,
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1938.
78

12. Anderson, P. A., Fischer, G.W., "A Monte Carlo Model of
Garbage Can Decision Processes", Conference Record
,
Stanford Univer si ty -Naval Postgraduate School Joint
Workshop on Decision Making in Military Organizations,
January, 1984.
13. Carley, K., "Garbage Can Efficiency - A Simulation",
Conference Record , Stanford University - Naval Postgrad-
uate School Joint Workshop on Decision Making in
Military Organizations, January, 1984.
14. Gibbons, J.D., Se lect in g and Orderi ng Population s , New
York, John Wiley and Son, 1977.
15. Spiegel, M.R., T heor y and Proble ms of Pr obabil it y and






Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 94943
3. Department Chairman, Code 52
Department of Computer Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
4. Department Chairman, Code 54
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
5. Associate Professor R.H. Wiessinger-Baylon
Code 54Wr
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
6. Captain W.P. Hughes, Jr., USN (ret)
Code 55H1
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
7. Assistant Professor Philip Bromiley
Code 54Bg
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
8. Assistant Professor Daniel Dolk
Code 54Dk






9. Professor Daniel Guinier
Code 52Dg
Department of Computer Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
10. Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN (ret)
The Chateaux
6171 Leesburg Pike
Falls Church, Virginia 22044
11. Dr. Joel S. Lawson
Naval Electronic Systems Command
C31 Systems and technology Directorate
251 1 Jefferson Davis Highway
National Center, No. 1





Naval Electronic Systems Command
Code 06
C31 Systems and Technology Directorate
2511 Jefferson Davis Highway
National Center, No. 1
Martin Van Buren Bldg.
Arlington, Virginia 22202
1 3 . Judy Jensen
Naval Electronic Systems Command
PME 120
C31 Systems and Technology Directorate
251 1 Jefferson Davis Highway
National Center, No. 1
Martin Van Buren Bldg.
Arlington, Virginia 22202











16. Lieutenant David Shimp, USN
Operations Officer
NSGA Adak
FPO Seattle, Washington 98777
17. Lieutenant Commander William A. Lillard, USN
Executive Officer
USS Tattnall (DDG-19)
FPO New York, New York 09501
18. Lieutenant David M. Birdwell, USN
Surface Warfare Officers School Command
Department Head Course













tl ** £*! P">ce.\J










Cohen, March and Olsen
'
' Garbage Can'* process
theory to the opera-
tional Battle Group Co-
mmander.
£»»'"<*>
'^A'
. ^

